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Abstract The public health consequences of the conflict in Iraq will likely continue
after the violence has subsided. Reestablishing public health security will require
large investments in infrastructure and the creation of effective systems of governance. On the question of governance, the allocation of powers in the new constitution
of Iraq is critical. Given the ease with which public health threats cross borders, the
constitution needs to grant to the federal government the legal authority to manage
such threats and simultaneously meet international requirements. Unfortunately, the
draft constitution does not accomplish this objective. If politically possible, the constitution should be amended to provide the federal government with this authority. If not
possible, the Iraqi federal government would have two options. It could attempt to use
alternative constitutional powers, such as national security powers. This option would
be contentious and the results uncertain. Alternatively, the federal government could
attempt to establish collaborative relationships with regional governments. Residual
sectarian tensions create potential problems for this option, however. Reflecting on
the Iraqi situation, we conclude that other federalizing countries emerging from conflict should ensure that their constitutions provide the federal government with the
necessary authority to manage threats to public health security effectively.

The human consequences of the Iraq war have been enormous (Burnham
et al. 2006; Alkhuzai et al. 2008). Although the majority of injuries and
This manuscript is based on information emerging from a workshop examining implementation
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workshop was supported by grants from the Canadian Institutes of Health Research, Public
Health Agency of Canada, Canadian International Development Agency, and the International
Development Research Centre.
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deaths are related to intentional violence, Iraq’s damaged infrastructure
is setting the stage for a public health crisis. Investment in infrastructure
will be required to prevent such a crisis from occurring. However, this
infrastructure alone will not be sufficient. The investment needs to be
accompanied by appropriate governance systems that will complement
efforts to ensure public health security in Iraq. The vision of a federal
Iraq contained in the draft constitution supported by a large majority in
a 2005 referendum, while having many merits, may create obstacles for
achieving such security.
Iraq and Sudan are the most recent states with a history of violent
domestic conflict to consider adopting a federal system of government.
Others, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Pakistan,
have already implemented federal systems, and still others, notably Sri
Lanka, are considering federal solutions to internal conflicts (Forum of
Federations 2007). An important consideration in the transition to federalism in these countries is the constitutional allocation of public health
powers between national and regional governments. As these countries
emerge from conflict, coordinated responses between levels of government will be a critical component of managing the public health challenges they will encounter.
Public health security, therefore, must be a priority in the design of new
federal constitutions. However, tensions exist in assigning authority for
public health security. Determining the optimal balance between national
and regional authorities will be essential as these countries formalize their
capacities to protect the health of their citizens. Iraq’s experience illustrates the challenges many federalizing countries face.
Constitutional Allocations of Powers
Related to Public Health Security

Protecting the public’s security is a core function of the state and part
of the “social contract” between the state and its citizens (Gostin 2001).
Historically, the government’s role in preserving security has been viewed
as protecting individuals from violence, whether domestic or external in
origin. However, in the current era, certain public health threats such as
pandemic influenza are also increasingly viewed as having a security
dimension. Although definitions of “health security” and “public health
security” vary (Fidler 2007), experts increasingly identify as security concerns public health threats with the potential to disrupt significantly the
normal functioning of societies. These threats tend to be communicable
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disease threats (e.g., pandemics, bioterrorism) but can include noncommunicable disease dangers triggered by accidental or intentional release
of nuclear, radiological, or chemical agents.
As the World Health Organization (WHO) has asserted, providing for
public health security requires providing for and maintaining measures to
protect and preserve population health from such threats (WHO 2007).
These measures include developing both the surveillance capacity that
can identify threats at an early stage and the capacity to respond to these
threats. Effective surveillance and response activities require the presence
of robust human and public health resources and coordination of activities
at all levels of governance.
The ability to provide for public health security is often a casualty of
violent conflict. Countries that experience complex emergencies, including civil strife, are susceptible to health crises emerging during and after
the emergency (Spiegel et al. 2007). Damage to infrastructure, loss of
housing, poor sanitation, and other factors increase the risk of the emergence of new public health threats such as contaminated water and food
systems and infectious disease outbreaks (Waldman and Martone 1999).
In addition to direct health consequences, inadequate response to these
threats by a newly formed government could undermine the population’s
likely already fragile confidence in the government’s credibility, which
could contribute to political instability.
Deciding on how to divide constitutional powers for achieving public
health security is therefore a serious consideration for states considering
federal systems of government. Unfortunately, in the past the constitutions of federal countries have often been silent or vague on public health
matters. This omission is understandable when one recognizes that some
of these constitutions were created prior to a modern understanding of
the science concerning the spread and control of public health threats.
Nevertheless, the failure to allocate these powers has proven problematic
in a modern era of public health science and governance (Wilson, McDougall, and Upshur 2006). Indeed, pressures created by globalization and
other developments are forcing many countries with federal governments
to engage in de facto “federalization” of public health governance (Fidler
2004a).
The new International Health Regulations 2005 (IHR2005, or regulations), which entered into force in 2007, increase the need for newly federalizing countries to carefully consider the allocation of public health
powers (WHO 2005a). The IHR 2005 draws a clear link between public
health and global security (Fidler 2005). All WHO member states transi-
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tioning to federal systems of government will have to comply with the IHR
2005, the provisions of which will require some centralization of public
health governance functions. The regulations require countries to be able
to detect, notify the WHO about, and respond to potential public health
emergencies of international concern. In addition, countries must develop
specified core surveillance and response capacities to prepare for potential
public health emergencies of international concern (Fidler 2004b; Gostin
2004). Although the regulations do not contain penalties for noncompliance, failure by a country to notify the WHO about disease events that may
constitute public health emergencies of international concern could result
in the WHO issuing warnings about travel to the region which could have
an adverse economic effect on the country in question (Fidler 2004b).
These demanding substantive provisions mean that the regulations will
prove challenging for established federal countries to implement (Wilson,
McDougall, and Upshur 2006). Implementation in newly federal countries
emerging from conflict could be even more difficult, a problem that will
only be made more challenging if the federal constitution is not created
with recognition of these international legal obligations concerning public
health security.
Potential Problem Areas Concerning Public
Health Security and Federalism

Despite the importance of jurisdictional clarity concerning powers related
to public health security, the assignment and exercise of these powers can
be contentious or, alternatively, overlooked. Failing to address the division of powers related to public health will be damaging when it comes
to responding to public health emergencies and conducting local surveillance for emerging public health threats. These two critical areas require
as much jurisdictional clarity as possible and, if feasible, the creation of
strong federal authority for assuring public health security.
Emergency Powers

One of the most contentious areas for a country emerging from civil conflict is determining how the federal government could declare a state of
emergency and what powers it has when it does so. In addressing public
health emergencies, a coordinated approach between federal and regional
governments and local authorities is the best approach (Wilson 2006).
However, for countries that are emerging from internal conflicts, the nec-
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essary levels of cooperation might be hard to produce and sustain. Even
in developed countries, coordination of responsibilities in emergencies has
been challenging, exacerbated by unclear constitutional authority among
the various levels of government (Bureau of International Organization
Affairs 2005).
For example, the constitutions of Canada, the United States, and Australia do not provide clear authority to the federal government to manage emergencies (The State of National Governance Relative to the New
International Health Regulations 2006). This problem occurred in Canada
during the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak,
where communication and coordination between the levels of government
was suboptimal (Campbell 2004). In the United States, the lack of clear
federal authority to intervene was identified by some officials as a problem in the response to Hurricane Katrina (Stout 2005). In Australia, the
commonwealth’s lack of emergency health powers had been noted as a
potential limitation in its ability to combat a pandemic or manage a bio
terrorism threat (Howse 2004).
The national governments of these countries subsequently took measures to address these gaps by utilizing different mechanisms within their
constitutional structures to increase federal authority and enhance cooperation during emergencies. In the aftermath of SARS, Canada created a
new public health agency and sought to establish more effective collaboration between orders of government rather than pursue aggressive federal
legislation (Wilson and Lazar 2005). The U.S. federal government has
relied upon its funding power to place conditions on federal assistance to
states for emergency preparedness (Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act, Pub. L. No. 109 – 417 [2006]). Australia enacted new legislation
based on federal security powers to enhance the commonwealth’s authority to manage public health threats (Parliament of the Commonwealth of
Australia 2007).
From the perspective of citizens in established federal states, constitutional restrictions on a central government’s authority to intervene during
a public health emergency may seem unreasonable. Furthermore, such
restrictions can lead to a highly paradoxical situation in which the WHO
can declare a public health event to be a public health emergency of international concern under the IHR 2005, even when the event does not match
the legal criteria to be considered a national public health emergency and
thus does not fall under federal jurisdiction (WHO 2005b). To illustrate,
during the SARS outbreak in Canada, the federal government could not
declare a public welfare emergency without the permission of the province

Published by Duke University Press

Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law

386   Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law

of Ontario. However, if the IHR 2005 had been in force at the time of
this event, the international outbreak would have likely been considered a
public health emergency of international concern.
From the perspective of political groupings and interests in newly federalized or federalizing states, the limitations on federal authority are somewhat more understandable. In particular, allocation of powers to regions
can work to protect the rights and interests of populations in those regions
from political domination or discrimination by the central government.
Even in established federal states, the need to protect minority populations
through federalism has at times remained a concern. For example, in Canada the federal use of the War Measures Act to curtail civil liberties in the
province of Quebec during the 1970 October Crisis was criticized by some
as unnecessary and out of proportion to the threat. In newly federalizing states, the utilization of federal emergency powers could be perceived
as a pretext for federal government intervention in regional government
affairs, thus functionally recreating a unitary state without the protections
federalism may provide for minority populations (Wilson 1995).
Surveillance

Public health surveillance involves a complex series of linked activities
related to the collection, analysis, and dissemination of data linked to
specific outcomes, and for this reason, it is unlikely to be mentioned in
the constitution of a federal state. Therefore, jurisdictional authority over
health surveillance will have to be inferred from other powers that have
been constitutionally allocated. Surveillance, however, is an essential
component of public health and is critical to every country’s ability to
identify threats at an early stage and take measures to control their spread.
Surveillance is particularly important for countries emerging from conflict. Effective measures to control the spread of disease are not possible
without early detection of potential outbreaks (Valenciano et al. 1999).
However, surveillance in conflict regions is difficult, as has been noted
in Iraq (Valenciano et al. 2003). Useful surveillance depends on timely
local collection of data, and it requires evaluation and verification at the
regional level. In the event of a serious or spreading emergency, it needs
action at the federal levels and possibly at the international level, as is
contemplated by the IHR 2005 (Baker and Fidler 2006).
Moreover, for surveillance to be most effective, countries need to standardize how it is done. Apart from the infrastructure and logistical challenges, postconflict countries may also encounter federal challenges to
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effective surveillance. Regional governments may be hesitant about allowing the level of monitoring by a central government required to ensure
harmonized surveillance practices. Perhaps regional governments may
fear that such oversight could erode their autonomy and encroach upon
individual rights. Regional governments may have apprehensions that data
they transfer to the central government will be used by the central government in a manner that infringes upon other areas of regional jurisdiction
or may be released to the public or other authorities in ways that could
be damaging to the affected region. Such problems and conflicts over the
sharing of information between regional and central governments were
identified by WHO officials as a critical problem in the management of
the SARS outbreak (Wilson, McCrea-Logie, and Lazar 2004; Alphonso
and York 2003).
Public Health Challenges Facing
a New Iraqi Federation

Beyond the ongoing violence, the population of Iraq faces numerous
threats to its health. Recent estimates from the United Nations Office for
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs indicate that large segments
of the Iraqi population do not have access to clean water and appropriate
hygiene and sanitary conditions. A 2007 UNICEF estimate found that
only one in three children under five have access to safe drinking water
(United Nations Security Council 2007). Rates for standard pediatric
immunizations have also been found to be in decline (WHO 2006; Ni’ma
et al. 2003). Evidence of the toll of poor water safety and sanitation can
be found in the 2007 cholera outbreak in Iraq, which resulted in approximately 4,500 laboratory-confirmed cases and twenty-two deaths (WHO
Representative’s Office in Iraq 2007). The WHO issued statements concerning the nature and extent of this outbreak and advised neighboring
states “to reinforce their active surveillance and preparedness systems”
(WHO 2007).
When hostilities cease, reestablishing the conditions necessary for public health security must be a priority of the new government. Emerging
from the first Gulf War and the ensuing economic sanctions, Iraq experienced large cholera outbreaks and marked increases in infant mortality
(Ascherio et al. 1992). A coordinated response to prevent serious public
health events from damaging fragile political, economic, and social conditions will require federal leadership both in terms of investment in the
local public health infrastructure and in terms of communicating emerg-
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ing health risks to regions. It will also require considerable effort at the
local public health level. This task applies not only to Iraq but also to the
international community because of the possible spread to other countries
of threats emerging in Iraq.
Federalism and Iraq

A federal solution is one mechanism by which the rights of geographically
situated ethnic and religious groups in Iraq can gain some measure of autonomy and protection, while the integrity of Iraq as a whole and the advantages of shared governance can be preserved (Brancati 2004). A federal
solution, however, has many obstacles to overcome, and each predominant
sectarian group has a considerable stake in the design of a federation.
The sectarian divisions within Iraq are both ethnic, between the Arab
majority and the Kurdish minority, and religious, between the Shia Arab
majority and the Sunni Arab minority. The Kurdish region has the greatest interest in a highly decentralized federation (Brancati 2004). The Shia
majority, in contrast, would prefer a more cohesive, centralized federation.
The decentralized nature of the draft constitution has led to accusations
from the Shia majority that the constitution implements a form of soft partition (Bruno 2007). While having a desire to have its autonomy protected
through a federal solution, the Sunni minority could lose access to oil revenue in a decentralized state because Iraq’s oil is found predominantly in
the Kurdish north and Shia south (Anderson 2005). Regional powers also
have much at stake in the design of the Iraqi federation. Turkey, in particular, would view suspiciously a federal solution that provides a strong,
autonomous Kurdish region, although it would view this more favorably
to the alternative of an autonomous Kurdish state.
Despite the approval by an overwhelming majority in a 2005 referendum, debate continues in Iraq on the draft constitution. Recognizing the
long process of establishing an effective federal state, a clause in the constitution outlines a mechanism for modifications (Article 137). Based on
this clause, a panel has been created to oversee changes to the constitution
with a focus on federal matters (Abdul-Zahra 2006).
The Iraqi Constitution and Public Health Security

Whatever the outcome of Iraqi revision of the constitution, cooperation on
public health security among Iraq’s regions and political factions will be
essential. Given the mutual vulnerability all groups in Iraq face from the
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transmission of disease, public health security may be an area on which
Shia, Sunni, and Kurds could agree in terms of the nature of the Iraqi federation. Even regions with established public health infrastructure remain
vulnerable if adjacent regions fail to adequately manage the emergence
of public health threats, which can rapidly cross political boundaries and
borders. Nevertheless, such agreement is not guaranteed, and sectarian
tensions may prevent the requisite collaborative relationships from forming. The constitutional allocation of responsibility for public health security will, therefore, be a critical component in determining the effectiveness of the new Iraq government’s ability to protect the health security of
its population. The federal government will need to have some authority
over matters related to public health security.
According to the draft Iraqi constitution, the constitution is the supreme
law of the country (Article 13, Final Draft Iraqi Constitution 2005). Health
is clearly an important component of the draft Iraqi constitution (appendix
A), which includes multiple references to health, including a reference to
“health security” in Article 30. The draft constitution, in a section titled
“Economic, social, and cultural liberties,” indicates that health is a right
of every Iraqi citizen, and further stipulates that the state is responsible for
public health and for providing “the means of prevention and treatment
by building different types of hospitals and medical institutions” (Article
31). In addition, the Iraqi state must “guarantee to the individual and the
family — especially children and women — social and health security and
the basic requirements for leading a free and dignified life” (Article 30).
The use of “health security” in this provision does not, however, refer
to the concept of “public health security” as employed in this article but
instead connects to the health component of social security and welfare
schemes. Thus, Article 30 does not provide a robust basis for arguing for
strong federal authority to address public health security threats.
Health and environmental protection are considered shared jurisdictions in the draft Iraqi constitution (appendix B). Importantly, however, the
constitution specifically states that powers not explicitly allocated to one
or another order of government in the constitution fall under the jurisdiction of the regions (Article 111). Further, in areas that are not exclusively
federal, regional legislation takes precedence (Article 117). Therefore, on
the surface at least, the constitution does not appear to provide the federal
government with sufficient authority to coordinate Iraq’s response to a
national public health emergency or its compliance with the IHR 2005.
This could clearly prove to be problematic in the immediate postconflict
period if existing public health problems worsen.
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Modifying the Iraqi constitution to provide the federal government with
the necessary authority over public health security should therefore be
strongly considered. The federal government will require explicit authority over the following: access to surveillance data; the ability to coordinate the creation of surveillance infrastructure; the ability to oversee
public health emergency response; and, perhaps, the ability to intervene
in a public health emergency if concern exists about transmission of the
emergency to other regions or internationally.
However, if express federal authority for public health security is not
politically possible, the Iraqi federal government would have to consider
other alternatives to address a public health security threat arising in one
of the regions. The federal government may seek to obtain the necessary
authority from areas of the constitution that are under exclusive federal
jurisdiction. These areas include authority for signing international agreements (Article 107) and “forming and executing national security policy” (Article 107). However, whether internal health security falls within
“national security policy” is unclear (Brown 2005).
The federal government could utilize the power to declare a state of
emergency to intervene in public health emergencies, although the constitution refers to this power primarily in the context of war (Article 57). The
Iraqi constitution also presumably provides the federal government with
taxation power (authority over fiscal and customs policy) and, therefore,
the capacity to use its spending power to direct policy (Article 107). The
federal government could offer financial incentives, in the form of conditional grants, to provide rewards for regional cooperation with public
health objectives. The Iraqi constitution also provides the federal government with the authority to regulate “commercial policy across regional and
governorate boundaries in Iraq” (Article 107). The U.S. federal government, for example, has the power to regulate international and interstate
commerce under the commerce clause, and the federal government has
exercised its commerce clause authority to regulate matters of interstate
commerce affecting public health.
The Iraqi constitution potentially provides mechanisms by which the
federal government could exercise authority for public health surveillance. The draft constitution provides that “the Iraqi National Intelligence
Service shall collect information, assess threats to national security, and
advise the Iraqi government” (Article 9). A very liberal interpretation of
this clause might allow for federal-level surveillance to preserve public
health security, but supporting such an interpretation would be problem-
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atic because public health surveillance is most effectively undertaken by
public health authorities, not intelligence agencies.
Human rights provisions in the draft Iraqi constitution may also provide
some basis on which the federal government could exercise its authority to
conduct public health surveillance. Threats to public health security constitute threats to the life of citizens of Iraq, and the constitution obliges the
Iraqi state to protect, among other rights, the right “to enjoy life, security
and liberty” (Article 33). However, resorting to a human rights justification for federal authority and action on public health security may worry
the regions because such a justification could have potentially very broad
application across every area of policy, not just public health.
Federal action in the realm of public health that is based on unclear constitutional authority and that regions may perceive as infringing on their
constitutional competencies is a less-than-ideal way of addressing threats
to public health security. It might not be supported by the courts, and it
also might inflame political opinion. Another option would be for the federal government to pursue strong collaborative arrangements with regional
governments (Wilson et al. 2008). These arrangements could include the
use of memoranda of understanding or agreements outlining conditional
funding strategies between the federal and regional governments. In terms
of collaboration on funding, the federal government could invest in the
surveillance capacity of local public health systems in exchange for guaranteed access to public health data of national or international concern. In
fact, a clause in the constitution requires the federal government to provide
sufficient funding so as to allow regional governments to carry out their
functions (Article 117). However, regional governments may not view conditional funding as a benign exercise but rather an attempt to expand federal power through the authority to tax and spend (Telford 2003).
Whatever approach the federal government takes to centralize public
health activities will have to be cognizant of the political risks associated with such efforts. The Kurdish region in particular may object to
any increased centralization, no matter how rational and necessary such
centralization seems from a neutral policy perspective. However, the risks
presented to the Kurdish region by inadequate public health security in
adjacent non-Kurdish regions and in neighboring countries provide a compelling argument for Kurdish leaders to concede that the federal government needs to be able to act effectively in the realm of public health.
No level of Kurdish autonomy will protect the Kurdish population from
transnational disease threats in the age of globalization.
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Conclusion

The draft Iraqi constitution will determine the mechanisms by which the
Iraq federal government establishes public health security for its population. The Iraqi situation also illustrates some of the dilemmas inherent in
constitutional allocations of powers concerning public health for newly
federalizing states. In protecting the autonomy of regions, the Iraqi constitution has limited the federal government’s ability to intervene to protect the larger population from public health threats. To manage emerging
public health threats and to meet international requirements, the federal
government may have to resort to powers likely not explicitly intended for
public health. However, the consequences of such an approach are uncertain and, at worst, may be destabilizing.
In the immediate postconflict period, the Iraqi federal government may
resort to declarations of emergency to address threats to public health
security that appear to be beyond the capacity of regional governments to
contain. While federal intervention to control a spreading public health
threat would likely be viewed in a completely different light from federal
military intervention to preserve domestic security, the use of broad emergency powers for public health purposes could, however, fuel regional
government suspicions and be perceived as an abuse of federal authority
and a threat to the autonomy of regions. A potentially less provocative
option would be to utilize the use of spending/appropriation powers to
enhance the federal role while acknowledging the important link between
investment in local capacity and national public health effectiveness.
Regional governments could still view this strategy with suspicion, seeing it as a way for the federal government to extend its jurisdiction and
weaken regional autonomy. In any case, the federal government will need
to have the necessary authority to conduct public health surveillance and
ensure adequate responses to public health emergencies. With ongoing
deliberations on the content of the draft constitution, an opportunity exists
to reexamine the distribution of powers related to the objective of public
health security.
Other countries considering federal constitutions will likely encounter similar challenges to those facing Iraq. Defining a clear federal role
for preserving public health security in new constitutions should be considered. Ideally, a federal government should have (1) access to public
health surveillance information, (2) the authority to oversee public health
emergency responses, and (3) where public health events threaten to cross
regional or national borders, the authority to intervene. The existence of
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such federal powers would improve the chances for achieving domestic
public health security and for facilitating compliance with international
legal obligations under the IHR 2005. Furthermore, clear and specific
allocation of public health powers will reduce the need to use broader
emergency powers for the purpose of managing public health threats as
well as other powers not specifically intended for public health purposes.
Addressing the challenge of public health security forthrightly in the
design of federal constitutions constitutes the best strategy for enabling
governments to meet their fundamental responsibility of protecting and
providing for the health of their citizens.
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Appendix A:
Health “Guarantees” in the Iraq Constitution1

Article 30
First: The state2 guarantee to the individual and the family — especially
children and women — social and health security and the basic requirements for leading a free and dignified life. The state also ensures the above
a suitable income and appropriate housing.
Second: The State guarantees the social and health security to Iraqis in
cases of old age, sickness, employment disability, homelessness, orphanage or unemployment, and shall work to protect them from ignorance, fear
and poverty. The State shall provide them housing and special programs
of care and rehabilitation. This will be organized by law.
Article 31
First: Every citizen has the right to health care. The state takes care of
public health and provide the means of prevention and treatment by building different types of hospitals and medical institutions.
Second: Individuals and institutions may build hospitals or clinics or
places for treatment with the supervision of the state and this shall be
regulated by law.
Article 32
The State cares for the handicapped and those with special needs and
ensure their rehabilitation in order to reintegrate them into society. This
shall be regulated by law.
Article 33
First: Every individual has the right to live in a safe environment.
Second: The State undertakes the protection and preservation of the environment and biological diversity. Every individual has the right to enjoy
life, security and liberty. Deprivation or restriction of these rights is pro1. This text is reproduced verbatim from the draft Iraqi constitution (Final Draft Iraqi Constitution 2005), found at the UNESCO Web site. Other translations of the constitution exist with
a different total number of articles and differences in article numbering.
2. “State” refers to the government of Iraq.
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hibited except in accordance with the law and based on a decision issued
by a competent judicial authority.
Appendix B: Allocation of Powers over
Health in the Iraq Constitution3
Potential Sources of Federal Authority

Article 9
D. The Iraqi National Intelligence Service shall collect information, assess
threats to national security, and advise the Iraqi government. This service
shall be under civilian control and shall be subject to legislative oversight
and shall operate in accordance with the law and pursuant to the recognized principles of human rights.
Article 57
Ninth: A. To consent to the declaration of war and the state of emergency
by a two-thirds majority based on a joint request from the President of
the Republic and the Prime Minister. B. The period of the state emergency shall be limited to 30 days, extendable after approval each time. C.
The Prime Minister shall be authorized with the necessary powers that
enable him to manage the affairs of the country within the period of the
state of emergency and war. A law shall regulate these powers that do not
contradict the constitution. D. The Prime Minister shall present to the
Council of Representatives the measures taken and the results within the
period of declaration of war and within 15 days of the end of the state of
emergency.
Article 107
The federal government shall have exclusive authorities in the following
matters:
First: Formulating foreign policy and diplomatic representation; negotiating, signing, and ratifying international treaties and agreements; negotiating, signing and ratifying debt policies and formulating foreign sovereign
economic and trade policy;
3. This text is reproduced verbatim from the draft Iraqi constitution (Final Draft Iraqi Constitution 2005), found at the UNESCO Web site. Other translations of the constitution exist with
a different total number of articles and differences in article numbering.
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Second: Formulating and executing national security policy, including
creating and managing armed forces to secure the protection, and to guarantee the security of Iraq’s borders and to defend Iraq;
Third: Formulating fiscal and customs policy, issuing currency, regulating
commercial policy across regional and governorate boundaries in Iraq;
drawing up the national budget of the State4; formulating monetary policy,
and establishing and administering a central bank. . .
Potential Limitations to Federal Authority

Article 110
The following competencies shall be shared between the federal authorities and regional authorities:
Third: To formulate the environmental policy to ensure the protection of
the environment from pollution and to preserve its cleanness in cooperation with the regions and governorates that are not organized in a region.
Fifth: To formulate the public health policy in cooperation with the regions
and governorates that are not organized in a region.
Article 111
All powers not stipulated in the exclusive authorities of the federal government shall be the powers of the regions and governorates that are not
organized in a region. The priority goes to the regional law in case of
conflict between other powers shared between the federal government and
regional governments.
Article 117
First: The regional authorities shall have the right to exercise executive,
legislative, and judicial authority in accordance with this constitution,
except for those powers stipulated in the exclusive powers of the federal
government.
Second: In case of a contradiction between regional and national legislation in respect to a matter outside the exclusive powers of the federal
government, the regional authority shall have the right to amend the application of the national legislation within that region.

4. “State” refers to the government of Iraq.
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Third: Regions and governorates shall be allocated an equitable share of the
national revenues sufficient to discharge its responsibilities and duties, but
having regard to its resources, needs and the percentage of its population.
Fifth: The Regional Government shall be responsible for all the administrative requirements of the region, particularly the establishment and
organization of the internal security forces for the region such as police,
security forces and guards of the region.
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